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EDITORIAL NOTES
DEEDS--ENTAL CAPACITY TO ExEcuTE.-The Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia, in a recent case,' has laid down the
rule that "when * * * a grantor in a deed is below the aver-
age of mankind in intellectual capacity, the law raises a presump-
tion against the validity of the deed." In thus prescribing a defi-
nite intellectual standard for persons who convey property, the
case marks a departure from former well-established holdings
of the West Virginia and the Virginia courts. In Greer v. Greers,2
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, in discussing the ques-
tion of competency of grantors, has said that "no particular de-
gree of mental acumen is to be prescribed as the measure of one's
capacity to execute deeds." This enunciation has been repeatedly
re-affirmed by the same court.3 The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, in considering the same subject,; has said that
"courts do not measure the capacity of persons" (grantor).
These holdings of the Virginia and the West Virginia courts
accord with the competency rule enforced elsewhere.5 The usual
statement of the competency rule is that the law does not attempt
to determine the degree of intelligence that parties must possess
to bind themselves by deed.6 The legal presumption is that all
persons, with well defined exceptions, 7 are competent to contract
and therefore execute valid deeds. And the only test of com-
petency laid down by the courts is "the capacity to recall the
property conveyed, the manner of disposing of it and the object
of the bounty." 8 Or differently stated, "if a person is capable of
knowing the nature, character and effect of his deed at the time
of making it, he is considered legally compos mentis."s' In mak-
ing application of this rule the courts have held that old age,
abatement of mental vigor and impairment of memory do not over-
come the legal presumption of competency."5
Comparison of the foregoing cases discloses that a higher degree
of intellectual capacity is required of the grantor under the hold-
I Morris i. Williams-Garrison, 128 S. E. 78 (W. Va. 1925).
A 9 Gratt. 330 (1852).
a Beverly v. Walden, 20 Gratt. 147 (1870); Wampler v. Harrell, 112 Va. 641,
72 S. E. 135 (1911); Huff v. Welch, 115 Va. 87, 78 S. E. 573 (1913).
, Woodville v. Woodville, 73 W. Va. 286, 60 S. U. 14G (1908).
5 See 13 Cyc. 573 and cases there cited.
O 1 DEvLin, DEEDS, § 64.
7 Insane, Infants. etc.. 1 Dnvwx, DEEDS § 64.
8 Woodvile v. Woodvi!le, supra; Miller v. Rutlege, 82 Va. 863, 1. S. E. 202(1887).. Black v. Post, 67 W. Va. 253, 67 S. E. 1072 (1910); Barnett, Committee V.
Greathouse et at., 77 W. Va. 514, 88 S. E. 1013 (1916); Carrigan, Committee, v.
17avis, 84 W. Va. 473, 100 S. E. 91 (1919).
10 White, Committee, v. Mooney. 73 W. Va. 304, 80 S. E. 844 (1914); DelaplaitL
et al v. Grubb et al., 44 W. Va. 612, 30 S. E. 201 (1898) ; Buckey v. Buckey et a.,
38 W. Va. 168, 18 S. E. 383 (1893); Teter v. Teter, 69 W. Va. 449. 53 S. E. 779
(1906).
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ing of the case of Morris v. Williams-Garrisn,1"' for it is apparent
that there are many persons who may know "the nature, char-
acter and effect of their deeds" and yet be "below the average
of mankind in intellectual capacity." Certain objections, how-
ever, are to be urged against the use of "the average of mankind
in intellectual capacity" as a standard to determine the competency
of persons to execute deeds. Surely to ascertain "intellectual
capacity," mental measurements would have to be made, some-
thing the courts before the case of Morris v. Williams-Garrison,12
declared they would not do. But it is obvious that if "the average
of mankind" is to be ascertained, not only would individual men-
tal measurements have to be made, but mental measurements of
the social or political group would be necessary; for the standard
proposed as a test of the competency of grantors--"the average
of mankind"--could only be determined in this way. Psycho-
analysts, however, are far from being in accord among themselves
as to the use and value of the mental tests they sponsor, and none
of them have even yet claimed that the intellectual average of
mankind has been calculated. It is submitted the courts have no
machinery juridically to make such determination.
A consideration of the law of averages discloses that the rule
in the ease of Morris v. Williams-Garrison, supra, divides man-
kind, and, therefore, those who have property to convey into two
approximately equal groups-those above the average, and those
below the average, in intellectual capacity: for it is a necessary
corollary of the law of averages that there should ordinarily be
approximately as many in one group as in the other. Those
above the average the rule of Morris v. Williams-Garrison de-
clares competent to convey, those below, incompetent. Herein
is the further objection to the rule that it places under contractual
disability, so far at least as the execution of deeds go, nearly one-
half of mankind, and, therefore, of the persons who have property
to convey. It is difficult to see how, in such a situation, there
could be a presumption of competency on the part of any one to
execute deeds. But even if the law should allow a presumption
of competency, it would be subject to be overcome by testimony
that the particular grantor was "below the average of mankind
in intellectual capacity." How could a prospective purchaser of
property, under this rule, ever be certain that his grantor was
1 supra n. 1.
12 upra n. 1.
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above "the average" and so intellectually competent? Would he
be required to demand that his grantor submit to mental tests
to determine his legal competency? Or otherwise would the pur-
chaser have to buy at his peril? The difficulties in such a rule
of mental competency proposed by the case of Morris v. Williams-
Garrison are obvious. It is submitted that every consideration of
public policy argues against such a rule.
-F . L. L.
THE PROCEDURAL STATUS IN WEST VIRGINIA OF A TRUSTEE IN
A DEED OF TRUST TO SECURE A DEBT.-In a recent West Virginia
case,1 the grantor in a deed of trust sued to cancel the deed of
trust and the notes secured thereby on the ground of fraud in
their procurement. One of the gr-unds of demurrer to the bill
was non-joinder of the trustee. The Supreme Court of Appeals
held that the trustee was not a necessary party. The holding in
this case revives in the mind of the writer a previously formed
impression to the effect that the West Virginia law has not always
been consistent in its treatment of the procedural status of a
trustee in an ordinary deed of trust executed for the purpose of
securing a debt.
It is perhaps unnecessary to cite authority to sustain the propo-
sition that ordinarily the effect of a deed conveying property
to a trustee, for whatever purpose, is to vest the legal title in the
trustee. So literally has this principle been accepted as true, and
so rigidly has it been enforced in the legal forum, that no small
space in the equity reports is taken up by cases in which equity,
looking after the affairs of the real party in interest, has found
it necessary to curb activities of the holder of the legal title who
undertakes to pursue his legal prerogatives too literally. It is in
pursuance of this principle that in many jurisdictions-perhaps
in all jurisdictions where a different practice is not authorized by
statute-the trustee, and not the beneficiary, in a deed of trust to
secure a debt is held to be the proper party to execute a release of
deed of trust.2 Of course a legal discharge of the debt secured
leaves the trustee shorn of any potentially active or contingent
powers that he may have possessed, so that he becomes a bare
repository of the legal title and thence has no right to deal in
any way with that title except to pass it back to the grantor, but
I Petrelli v. PetreIll Coal Co., 127 S. E. 915 (W. Va. 1925).
2 2 JONES ON MORTGAGES (7th ed.) 598. "Where a mortgage takes the form of a
deed of trust, the legal title Is vested in the trustee, and he Is therefore the proper
verson to execute a release." 27 Cyc. 1417.
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